The IG report indicated plenty of faults at Boeing as part of the ongoing certification process. The investigation was prompted by the two fatal crashes within five months of each other, an event the House recognized as. Photo: Boeing Boeing did not release information on MCASThe US House Committee responsible for investigating BoeingвЂ™s 737 MAX airplanes issued their preliminary report on Friday, identifying failures on the part of Boeing and the Federal Aviation administration (FAA).

READ (December 3, 2020): Ryanair Orders 75 More Boeing 737 MAX Jets.NTSC Indonesia publishes preliminary report on JT610 Boeing 737 MAX 8 accident. READ (December 22, 2020): Alaska Airlines Boosts 737 MAX Orders and Options to 120 Jets. READ (January 27, 2021): Boeing Responds to EASA Approval to Resume 737 MAX Operations in Europe. For media inquiries, please reach out to mediaboeing.com.

In that Technical Familiarization Meeting, Boeing presented 482 slides of information, of which 23 covered the primary aircraft flight controls. Boeing was seeking to certify the MAX as a derivative of the already-certified 737 Next Generation. Photo: BoeingIn 2012, Boeing and the FAA held a Technical Familiarization Meeting, which are official events where FAA representatives and flight safety experts learn about the new design changes on derivative aircraft. The MCAS system has been of particular interest to regulatory agencies. The problem, however, was that the 737 MAX MCAS only relied on input from one angle of attack (AOA) sensor while the 767 relied on the median input value of both sensors.Stay informed:В Sign up for our daily aviation news digest. MCAS had already been covered under existing regulations, per the manufacturer, and was included on Boeing 767 refueling tankers that fly for the military.

Photo: Getty ImagesBoeing did have a reason for this. Boeing did not reveal much of the MCAS systemвЂ™s details to the FAA until later on in the certification process. And, within those, only two lines of text referenced the MCAS system.

This is one thing that the FAA is working on.Removing MCAS from the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM)Boeing requested and received permission from the FAA to remove references to MCAS from its FCOM and Other Differences Requirements tables. As per the IG report, the FAA вЂњfully implemented the ODA program to standardize its oversight of operations (e.g., aircraft manufacturers) that are approved to perform certain delegated functions on its behalf.вЂќ The report found that the FAA relied heavily on this program without a solid risk-based oversight approach. Photo: Getty ImagesThe FAA also runs an Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program.

The FAA made the decision, thinking that MCAS would only activate in high-speed situations and high load factors (load factors being the ratio of aerodynamic forces divided by the weight of the aircraft) with a maximum range of 0.55 degrees at speeds of 0.7 Mach or higher.However, Boeing had modified the MCAS system on the day of this approval. Photo: Getty ImagesOne of the issues here, however, was that Boeing had modified the MCAS system. The large engines on the MAX were something the FAA was keen on studying, according to the report. This approval was granted verbally by an FAA representative.

For now, however, the FAA and Boeing are moving forward with recertifying the aircraft after being grounded for over one year.Publicly, both the FAA and Boeing will also have to work to regain trust. Moving forward, the two will have to find ways to reduce those lapses and prevent MAX-like sagas from ever happening again. For now, the reportвЂ™s goal is to simply gather and present the information and timeline for the 737 MAX.Essentially, what is clear is that throughout the certification process, there were lapses on both Boeing and the FAAвЂ™s part. The IG expects to report further in the future and potentially add any recommendations. Photo: Getty Images What next?The IG report did not explicitly make any recommendations since the FAA is working on refining its oversight of the certification process. The IG cites these discrepancies as a вЂњlack of consistent and transparent communication both between Boeing and the FAA, as well as within the FAA.вЂќ Boeing altered the MCAS system without everyone involved in the certification process at the FAA being aware of it.

However, the long-term impacts of this grounding remain to be seen.

Boeing 737 Max Preliminary Report